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I. When Scarcity is Not Moderate 
 
 
 In May of 1846, 82 American pioneers left Independence, Missouri, bound for 
California. Normally, those traveling the California Trail would leave mid-April to save 
time to cross the western mountain passes before winter. When the group arrived in 
Wyoming, sensing the urgency of a late start, they elected to take an untested shortcut 
through the Wasatch Mountains. This shortcut ultimately added a month to their 
expedition, and by early November, they found themselves stranded beneath a blizzard in 
the mountains of the Sierra Nevada. With the mountain passes now rendered 
impenetrable, the pioneers retreated and set up camp at the nearby Truckee Lake to wait 
out the winter.1 
 Quickly, the food and supplies they had left dwindled, and one by one, the settlers 
began to perish from starvation. As their numbers dropped, the remaining survivors 
confronted the desperate reality of the situation: no food, no way out, and no end in sight. 
Without any resources to maintain themselves, the group engaged in one of the most 
grotesque acts a person can do; they boiled the frozen bodies of their fallen comrades and 
consumed their flesh.2 
 This is not a story about the Donner Party, but a story about scarcity. More 
specifically, how does our conception of “what we should do” change when we lack the 
means to sustain our normal obligations? When the surviving members were eventually 
                                                 
1 Evan Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party,” History.com 
(A&E Television Networks, April 14, 2016), https://www.history.com/news/10-things-
you-should-know-about-the-donner-party. 
 
2 Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party.” 
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rescued in April of 1847, they readily admitted to cannibalism. They were not convicted 
or charged with any criminal acts. 
 Just as people can find themselves with new standards of justice in dire 
circumstances, many governments find themselves making decisions in situations of 
extreme scarcity. There is no shortage of literature providing guidance for just policy 
choices in the developed world. Famously, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, lays out 
the circumstances in which justice can exist. Rawls understands these circumstances as 
“the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.”3 
Among them, Rawls posits the necessity of “moderate scarcity,” where not only are 
resources not so overabundant that “cooperation become[s] superfluous,” but conditions 
not “so harsh that fruitful ventures . . . break down.”4 
 But what happens when scarcity is not moderate? Rawls thrives when 
distinguishing what is just when circumstances are ideal and these circumstances are 
presupposed. However, what does this mean for the government of Burundi, with a GDP 
per capita of just $700?5 These conditions, by any measure, would qualify as harsh. 
Reality confronts us with an abundance of such harsh conditions. Burundi cannot afford 
to create an extensive system of “equal basic liberties.”6 Their economic capabilities 
                                                 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 109. 
 
4 Rawls, 110. 
 
5 “COUNTRY COMPARISON: GDP - PER CAPITA (PPP),” The World Factbook 
(Central Intelligence Agency), accessed June 13, 2020, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html. 
 
6 Rawls, 266. 
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restrict their capacity to create the justice prescribed by the standards of moderate 
scarcity.7 This paper carves out a space not in ideal theory, but nonideal theory focused 
on the absence of moderate scarcity.  
This is a descriptive argument, focused within the sphere of how governments 
actually function. To that end, this paper is an account of how rights work under extreme 
restrictions, what makes these rights robust and valuable in practice, and how a nation 
can achieve a larger bundle of rights. 
 The last pioneer to be rescued from the Sierra Nevada was a Prussian man, Lewis 
Keseberg. When he was finally rescued in April of 1847, rumors circulated from other 
survivors that Keseberg had not only cannibalized the bodies of other travelers but had 
murdered them for food.8 While Keseberg was never formally charged due to the lack of 
evidence, it was clear that had there been evidence, he would have faced certain 
punishment. 
 In conditions of moderate scarcity, neither cannibalism nor murder is remotely 
acceptable. Nevertheless, when travelers found themselves trapped in a snowstorm with 
no way out, one became acceptable, and the other did not. Why? What determines, when 
trapped in the snowstorm, which obligations remain, and which fall by the wayside? 
 In his book Dark Ghettos, Thomas Shelby, similarly, argues extreme scarcity 
alters obligations, in this case: in the ghettos. Shelby argues for different standards for 
                                                 
7 “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Burundi,” Human Rights Watch, January 14, 
2020, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/burundi. 
 
8 Andrews, “10 Things You Should Know About the Donner Party.” 
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criminal acts that result from “inequities in the prevailing opportunity structure,” because 
“one is not necessarily being unreasonable when one chooses unlawful means to attain 
the expected standard of living.”9 But just as Lewis Keseberg was held to a certain 
standard, regardless, Shelby maintains that this scarcity “does not mean that the ghetto 
poor have no moral duties to one another or to others.”10 Even for those living in ghettos, 
there are still duties, such as avoiding “unnecessary suffering” and “mutual respect.”11  
 Shelby focuses on how nonideal theory might shed light on those living in harsh 
conditions in circumstances of injustice. Yet, people can find themselves in situations of 
extreme scarcity, not as a result of unjust circumstances created by human beings, but by 
the randomness and harshness of the world. The Donner Party did not find themselves 
trapped in a snowstorm with dwindling supplies because any person or government 
wronged them. No, they were thrust into a terrible situation because of weather patterns 
they could not predict. But just the same, their obligations changed—cannibalism became 
acceptable—in light of their options. Routinely, we observe an individual person’s 
obligations broaden and narrow in conjunction with the resources at their disposal, 
regardless of the cause. Should we not expect governments’ obligations to do the same? 
 So, to the question at hand: what obligations do governments have when they find 
themselves, metaphorically speaking, trapped in a snowstorm? The world is populated 
                                                 
9 Tommie Shelby, “Part III: Rejecting the Claims of Law — Crime,” in Dark Ghettos: 
Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2016), https://books.apple.com/us/book/dark-ghettos/id1176267048. 
 
10 Shelby, “Part III: Rejecting the Claims of Law — Crime,” 
 
11 Ibid. 
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with countries living with an extreme scarcity of resources. The government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo generated only $4.63 billion in revenue in 2017, less 
than 5% of Alphabet’s revenue the same year.12 What if a government must choose 
between providing a police force and providing clean water; what is the right thing to do 
when either outcome would represent an injustice in the developed world? Similarly, if 
“ought implies can,” they cannot be criticized for failing to provide both water and police 
if they cannot afford both. Governments under the right circumstances must be able to 
make terrible choices, justly.  
 When discussing an individual’s obligations, we often speak in the language of 
“what they owe to other individuals.” In contrast, discussions concerning governments 
should first revolve around what they owe to their citizens. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
answers this question by providing a framework for determining a just bundle of rights 
and distributions. If Rawls requires moderate scarcity as a precondition for justice, then, 
at least in part, the most just end for a government in extreme scarcity must be to take its 
citizens to moderate scarcity so that they too may experience full justice; they must guide 
their country out of the snowstorm. 
                                                 
12 John Callaham, “Alphabet Records $110 Billion in Revenue for 2017, Google's Annual 
Hardware Sales Doubled,” Android Authority, February 1, 2018, 
https://www.androidauthority.com/alphabet-q4-2017-earnings-834774/; “The World 
Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic of The,” The World Factbook (Central 
Intelligence Agency), accessed June 13, 2020, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
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 This paper does not answer the question of how they can do this. Instead, it 
provides the language for discussions centering around the choices developing nations 
must make concerning human rights.  
 In Chapter Two, Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein’s book, The Cost of 
Rights, serves as a springboard. Holmes and Sunstein argue that, from a descriptive 
perspective, negative rights—traditionally understood—do not exist; they are a myth. 
Dispelling with the idea of negative rights will reveal an unfortunate, yet crucial, truth. 
All rights are positive rights. Hence, all rights have costs.  
 Chapter Three uses this truth to create a new framework for understanding rights 
within the policymaking process: not as endowed, but as a type of good that governments 
must “purchase” for their citizens. Like most goods, rights can exist to varying degrees of 
quality. Governments are responsible for creating and paying for the institutions 
necessary to maintain and protect different rights.  
This new framework will move us into Chapter Four, where we will ground 
“rights as goods” within the reality of extreme scarcity. Situated within this context, we 
will confront the reality that all nations will not be able to purchase all rights and will 
instead have to make choices between them. Instead of asking, “what rights do we have?” 
nations must ask, “what rights are worth paying for?” Additionally, can a nation buy 
“cheaper,” less robust, versions of a right if that is all they can afford?  
 In Chapter Five, we will grapple with whether certain rights are more valuable, 
not intrinsically, but specifically to a developing nation. This chapter invokes Amartya 
Sen’s conception of instrumental freedoms from Development as Freedom to highlight 
how some rights can derive value through how they connect and facilitate the creation of 
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other rights. In the context of a government attempting to maximize extremely scarce 
resources, rights that facilitate economic development have more value. Economic 
development is not an end within itself; instead, economic development is a means for 
governments to purchase larger, higher-quality, bundles of rights for their citizens. 
Consequently, conversations concerning which rights should be prioritized for 
developing nations should include the language of which rights will allow for the most 
economic development as a means for growing a nation’s “purchasing power” for other 
rights. In other words, even if, according to a moral theory, a specific right has less 
intrinsic value, a right can be more valuable for a developing nation if it grows that 
nation’s ability to acquire other rights. 
 In this way, nations will exist within a continuum where their obligations will 
expand in line with their resources. Importantly, this continuum falls below whatever 
threshold where an ideal theory kicks in, such as Rawls’ first principles at the threshold 
of moderate scarcity. In truth, the threshold does not matter. The theory in this paper 
represents a pathway forward towards more resources and more rights. At what point on 
this pathway and which obligations of ideal theory shall apply is a different question for a 
different paper, and not crucial towards understanding the issues addressed in this one. 
As will be argued in more detail, more rights and resources are necessary for almost any 
ideal theory to apply.   
 Finally, Chapter Six will highlight the distinct advantage that such conversations 
have in creating a neutral space for discussion. Specifically, regardless of one’s held 
opinions regarding the “ideal” bundle of rights—whether they lean towards 
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libertarianism, classical liberalism, or any other belief system—all can profitably 
participate in discussions concerning rights using the language of economic development. 
 My hope for this paper, ultimately, is to provide the tools for conversations 
surrounding rights for struggling nations. These conversations, inherently, involve 
tackling seemingly impossible tasks: choosing some rights that many would consider 
basic over others. These tools are lacking within the existing canon of ideal theory. The 
privilege of nations living in moderate scarcity is that they can choose to ignore the 
reality of the snowstorm. But for those nations making their way out of the storm, they 
require a means for choosing among which normally unjust methods are not only just, but 
necessary. 
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II. The Myth of Negative Rights 
 
 
 This chapter primarily seeks to synopsize a central argument of Stephen Holmes 
and Cass R. Sunstein’s book, The Cost of Rights. As foreshadowed in Chapter One, this 
paper concerns, in part, whether nations may purchase rights as goods for their citizens. 
To that end, understanding the relationship between costs and rights is essential. 
However, this chapter is not a calculus of the specific costs of rights; instead, it is an 
answer to the questions: do rights have costs? And if so, which? Spoiler alert: the answer 
is “yes” and “all of them.” 
 Holmes and Sunstein begin by grounding their argument within a descriptive 
realm as opposed to a moral realm. They write that they are “more interested in 
explaining how legal systems function and less oriented towards justification.”13 
Importantly, this paper exists within a similar sphere focused on the reality of governance 
and the application of justice rather than theory.14 
 From this perspective, Holmes and Sunstein introduce a popular “dichotomy” 
found in legal scholarship: positive versus negative rights. There are many more robust 
definitions of positive and negative rights that rely more heavily on notions of private 
moral obligations. These definitions have their own value. However, for the purpose of 
this paper, we will assume the definitions Holmes and Sunstein provide fitted to their 
                                                 
13 Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on 
Taxes (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2000), 16. 
 
14 This chapter borrows heavily from an essay I wrote for a PPE Politics seminar my 3rd 
year of college. This essay was written in response to reading The Cost of Rights for the 
very first time. This essay, and the thoughts that composed it, laid the groundwork and 
eventually served as the foundation for this project. 
 
13 
descriptive argument. Ultimately, it does not matter if these definitions are accepted, 
merely that in this context, the terms “positive” and “negative” correspond to Holmes and 
Sunstein’s understanding. 
 According to this understanding, negative rights are those that “ban and exclude 
government,” while positive rights “invite and demand government.”15 Holmes and 
Sunstein intend to reject this understanding to arrive at their desired conclusion, “all 
rights are positive rights.”16 This is not to say that negative rights do not exist morally. 
Perhaps, it is true there are certain rights the government should be excluded from. But 
from a descriptive perspective, the question becomes: is the government excluded from 
these rights in order for them to exist in practice?  
 To answer this question, they run through a few examples that highlight the 
paradoxical nature of negative rights. For example, they offer a right that intuitively fits 
neatly into the “negative” category: the right against being tortured by police officers and 
prison guards. At first glance, one might assume such a right obviously requires no 
government action: only that the government refrains from torture. Yet, Holmes and 
Sunstein highlight that for a state to actually guarantee this right, they must pay salaried 
doctors who are willing to submit evidence in court to check up on inmates. More 
broadly, rights require a judiciary to protect against violations.17 In fact, to protect 
violations of any right, a judiciary is required to enforce punishment in the case of 
                                                 
15 Holmes and Sunstein, 40. 
 
16 Ibid, 48. 
 
17 Ibid, 45. 
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violations. Therefore, minimally, all rights cost “whatever it costs to recruit, train, supply, 
pay and monitor” the judiciary.18 
 If the cost of these institutions is the minimum, Holmes and Sunstein provide 
numerous examples of more “costly” rights. For example, rights that demand government 
agencies to provide remedies and interpret legislation.19 Therefore, if all rights cost—at a 
minimum—the price of a judiciary, then legal rights presuppose the judiciary.20 
Furthermore, if almost all government revenue stems, in some form, from taxes, then 
legal rights also presuppose taxes. 
 What are taxes? They are a positive act of government. They not only “invite” 
government, they “demand” it. They must be legislated, collected, and enforced, all 
positive acts of government. It is this quality that leads to Holmes and Sunstein’s 
conclusion: if legal rights presuppose taxes, and all taxes are positive acts of government, 
then all rights are positive rights.21 
 Why is this conclusion so crucial for this paper? If we accept that all rights are 
positive, then we accept that all rights have some cost, even if it is to varying degrees. If 
this were not the case, all developing nations could conceivably have every single 
negative right robust, protected, and in place. These negative rights would be free; they 
                                                 
18 Holmes and Sunstein, 48 
 
19 Ibid. 48 
 
20  In Western thought, the adversarial system is held up as the standard for the Rule of 
Law. If such a system involves representation, as it does in the United States and many 
other countries, this facet alone can be costly enough to even challenge the capabilities of 
nations with moderate scarcity. 
 
21 Holmes and Sunstein, 44-48. 
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would not be subject to the same limitations that extreme scarcity of resources poses on 
so-called positive rights.  
 This is not the case. If these rights, and all rights, do indeed carry a financial price 
tag, then we can better understand why a government struggling in extreme scarcity 
would have to choose between rights. They cannot afford them all. If all rights have 
costs, all of us, not just developing nations, find ourselves confronted with a new 
articulation of a relatively old question. Instead of asking, “what rights do we have?” we 
must ask ourselves, “what rights are worth paying for?” 
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III.    Rights as Goods 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, we established a crucial feature of legal rights. They all 
have costs. In this chapter, we will springboard off of this recognition to make a 
relatively small, but perhaps uncomfortable, move. We can think about legal rights as 
goods to be purchased by governments on behalf of their citizens.  
 This mindset seems to fly in the face of everything we teach about rights. Often, 
that they are inalienable and equal for all human beings. The idea that a government 
could choose to—or choose not to— “purchase” a right for its citizens appears directly 
counter to that understanding. 
 We must recognize that this conception of rights is strictly applicable in the moral 
sense. They speak to our private obligations. Consequently, these beliefs about moral 
rights can coexist with a reformulation of how we think of legal rights. Moral rights run 
parallel to legal rights; they inform each other, but they are not each other. 
 If when legal rights exist, they have costs, what happens when legal rights do not 
have costs? Logic would dictate that based on the previous premise—if a legal right has 
no cost—it does not exist. If a government does not collect taxes, does not fund a 
judiciary, does not create the necessary institutions, then there exist neither protections 
nor means for repercussions if a citizen finds this right violated. Legally, the right is not 
there. 
 Morally speaking, there is no difference between what rights you have when the 
government funds a judiciary, and when there is no judiciary. If you believe that the 
government has an obligation not to violate your freedom of speech in the former 
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context, then this obligation remains in the latter. However, if the government chooses to 
disregard this obligation and violates this right anyways, you can seek protection from a 
judiciary in the former case, but not in the latter.  In this way, legal rights are distinct 
from moral rights. Moral rights mandate what everyone should or should not do. Legal 
rights dictate what happens if someone chooses to ignore this mandate.  
 This is true in the developing world, just as it is true in the developed world. In 
the United States, there are plenty of rights that we have decided not to afford legal 
protections. For example, many may believe they have a moral right not to lie and not be 
lied to, barring a few exceptions. Yet, there is no legal consequence for telling a lie in the 
US except in specific situations where you can prove damages. Protections (outside of 
previously stated cases) against being lied to have zero budgetary costs for the United 
States government, and therefore legally, the right does not exist, despite its moral status. 
As Holmes and Sunstein write that “a legal right exists, in reality, only when and if it has 
budgetary costs.”22 
Conceivably, if we imagine for a moment the First Amendment, the government 
could pass a law outlawing lying. Given how often people lie, giving this law teeth would 
take considerable effort. A new court would be made dedicated to lying cases, or a 
special department in the police force focused on tracking down liars. These new 
institutions would require additional funding. To pay for these new costs, the government 
would likely need to levy a new tax. 
                                                 
22 Holmes and Sunstein, 19. 
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 So, moral rights are not legal rights. But they can be if, through our governments, 
we choose to make them so. It is this act—of choosing—that acts as the vehicle for 
thinking of legal rights as goods to be purchased. A nation and its citizens are consumers 
of rights. A nation’s government must decide that it desires a legal right for its citizens, as 
an individual decides it desires a sweater for his or her person. However, first, both must 
calculate the cost of their respective “good.” In the case of the individual, they check the 
price tag in the store.  
 For the nation, it is a policymaking exercise. The nation must decide what 
institutions are necessary to make a right exist. These costs will be dependent on the type 
of citizens within the nation. For example, we can imagine a society composed of well-
intentioned citizens that defer entirely to the government to set up laws and will respect 
those laws regardless of what they are. In this society, there would be no violators of 
laws. Consequently, there would be no need for institutions to handle these violators, 
making the costs of legal rights absurdly cheap, if not bordering on free.  
Would this be a case of legal rights without costs? Possibly, but unfortunately, 
human history has yet to provide us with such a nation where violators of rights and laws 
do not exist. This paper’s focus is grounded in real-world decisions. We can safely 
assume that all legal rights there will eventually be at least one violator. Therefore, all 
legal rights will, indeed, have costs.  
On the other end of the spectrum, we can consider a society built on greed with no 
respect for moral values. How would the costs of legal rights be different in this 
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situation?23 If every citizen is a potential violator, then that nation would face extremely 
high price tags for the purchase of legal rights. In the real world, nations will find 
themselves situated between these two extremes, with the cost of legal rights existing, in 
part, as a function of where they sit on this spectrum. 
 What if a law is enforced not by government adjudication and sanctions, but by 
the social actions—via outcasting—of the citizens? In this case, there are costs, but the 
government does not suffer them. From a government perspective, the legal right might 
be considered costless. However, again, on the scale of a nation, it seems improbable that 
a law could ever be fully enforced without government intervention. For example, we can 
imagine a murderer with no interest in taking part in society content to live in the woods. 
Social outcasting would not be enough to protect the right to life from such a violator. 
Much like the case of the perfectly well-intentioned society, we can safely put this 
situation aside while focusing on developing nations. Nevertheless, if this framework 
were applied elsewhere, these considerations could be taken into account. 
 After determining cost, nations must consider whether this purchase is affordable. 
Do they have the money to create these intuitions? If not, can they borrow it? If they do 
put forth resources to protect the right, the right now exists legally. Similarly, the 
individual gives the store their debit card and walks out wearing a brand-new sweater. 
 Obviously, there are key differences between buying a right and buying a sweater. 
Most notably, the notion of transfer. Someone owns the sweater previously, and 
purchasing it will result transfer costs to the initial owner in exchange for the garment. A 
                                                 
23 First, we might wonder how a society lacking all morality came together to enforce a 
conception of moral rights, but that is neither here nor there. 
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legal right is not owned previously. The United States does not buy its right to free press 
from Australia. When it comes to legal rights, the act of purchasing is also an act of 
creation.  
 If legal rights are the goods, then what is the marketplace? What legal rights are 
available for purchase? In this scheme, purchasing a right is an act of making a moral 
right legal. Therefore, whatever we consider as moral rights determines the possibilities 
of which legal rights we would purchase.  
 This is where ideal theory plays a role. For example, the set of right Rawls 
prescribes for a nation living in moderate scarcity would determine the available “goods,” 
or potential rights, that a nation would purchase. Why? Conceivably, a government could 
build institutions and fund protections for your legal right never to be given a gift. Under 
this policy, if someone did give you a gift, you could sue them. Of course, no one would 
ever want or need these protections. The rights we would want to purchase would be 
those that we feel, morally, we are owed, and should be protected. 
 The other way we can think of rights as goods is with respect to quality. When an 
individual goes to a clothing store, they face more than the choice of whether to buy a 
sweater or not. Often, there are multiple sweaters available. Some might be cheaper but 
made of poor-quality fabric, and others might be much more expensive, but higher 
quality. Legal rights can share these characteristics. Let us consider the right to private 
property. There is a range of protections for one’s right to private property. Imagine, at 
the lowest end of the spectrum, a nation pays for one policeman and one judge for the 
entire population. Technically speaking, this nation has attempted to purchase your right 
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to private property, but they have bought such a poor-quality version of it, akin to having 
no right at all. This nation has purchased a sweater made of soggy paper towels. 
 A nation could also purchase a high-quality version of this right. Imagine, instead, 
the government assigns a policeman and judge to every citizen. A citizen of this country 
would have an incredibly robust version of the right to private property. This is a sweater 
made of silk laced with gold.  
 Such a purchase would only be an option for nations with obscene wealth (and 
that do not care about diminishing marginal returns). A nation going to the marketplace 
of rights must not only consider what rights are available but also what quality of each 
right is available. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, India experimented 
with both an adversarial system and a mediation system for enforcing the Rule of Law.24 
However, due to the country’s economic restrictions, the nation can only afford to 
provide court dates for a small number of citizens, which violates the idea of rights as 
equally accessible to all.25 While mediation might not offer the same quality of Rule of 
Law, the system is much more affordable and thus accessible to more of the population.26 
Depending on economic capabilities, some protections for rights might be beyond a 
nation’s budget, and the country’s citizens would benefit overall from a more affordable 
option.27 
                                                 
24 Karina T Hwang, “CMC Senior Theses,” CMC Senior Theses (2015), 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1171. 
 
25  Hwang, 44. 
 
26  Ibid. 
 
27  Ibid. 
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 Why is it important to understand rights as goods? As individuals, our thinking is 
primed to make choices about the purchase of goods; we do it practically every day. Is 
this sandwich worth it? Do I really need a new shirt? Which movie is better? We are also 
primed to consider goods within the context of available resources and tradeoffs. If we 
only have fifty dollars in our bank account, we cannot afford a pair of shoes and a shirt. 
We must choose.  
The language of goods, something that feels natural, can be transferred to the 
world of rights, something that may feel unnatural. But it is the intersection of these two 
worlds that will allow developing nations to fully maximize their resources. Rights as 
goods and nations as purchasers will lay the foundation for a more robust understanding 
of the decisions developing nations must make. 
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IV. Unaffordable Rights 
 
 The Human Freedom Index is a measure defined as “the absence of coercive 
constraint.”28 Co-published by the Cato Institute, the Index is notably broad.29 In this 
paper, we will use the Human Freedom Index to understand different nation’s protections 
of human rights relative to each other. This Index does not cover exactly what we are 
after. For example, part of the Human Freedom Index uses “actual crimes committed” as 
a measure of safety. If this number were low because of a very moral population that 
does not commit crimes, it would not necessarily mean that nation has more robust rights 
protections.30 Regardless, the Human Freedom Index is a helpful tool for approximating 
the degree to which different nations protect human rights. 
  In 2018, the countries with the five lowest GDPs measured on the Human 
Freedom Index were: Seychelles, Gambit, Belize, Central African Republic, and 
Bhutan.31 All five of these nations’ GDPs were less than 0.01% of the GDP of the United 
                                                 
28 “Human Freedom Index,” Cato Institute, March 26, 2020, 
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States. Not a single one of these countries ranked within the top 60 of the 162 measured 
nations.32 Not a single country within the bottom 35% of GDP rankings ranked within the 
top 50 of the 2019 Human Freedom Index.33 This begs the question: why can the poorest 
countries not maintain a robust system of protected rights on par with wealthy countries? 
 As an aside, the reverse of this phenomenon does not exist; wealthy countries do 
not necessarily protect rights to the greatest degree. For example, China has the second-
highest GDP, yet is only ranked 126 on the Human Freedom Index.34 Chapter Five will 
discuss the reason for this disparity in greater detail, but the simplest explanation is that 
wealth only enables rights; it does not guarantee them.35 
 Back to the question at hand: why are poor countries unable to protect rights like 
wealthy countries? The bottom 68 lowest-ranked countries by GDP do not even break the 
Human Freedom Index’s top 50.36 This trend is not surprising. Most do not envision 
developing nations as leaders in human rights. By examining this trend through the lens 
of the framework laid in Chapters One and Two, we can better understand the connection 
between GDP and rights. 
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 In The Cost of Rights, Holmes and Sunstein paint a bleak picture for citizens not 
living in developed nations, “unfortunate individuals who do not live under a government 
capable of taxing and delivering an effective remedy have no legal rights.”37 Eloquently 
put, “statelessness spells rightlessness.”38 Yet, Holmes and Sunstein speak broadly when 
discussing a government incapable of taxing. On the one hand, “statelessness” could be 
referring to a dysfunctional government, one that simply cannot carry out the necessary 
tasks to collect taxes. Whether due to the incompetency of government officials, or some 
other reason such as geographic constraints, there is some obstacle in the way of 
transferring wealth into the revenue stream. On the other hand, Holmes and Sunstein 
could also be referring to a perfectly competent government governing a people too poor 
to pay sufficient taxes to support a robust system of rights. So, while yes, “statelessness 
spells rightlessness,” in this case, poverty also spells rightlessness. In Chapter Three, we 
determined that legal rights must be “bought” in some sense. In this chapter, we confront 
the reality that if we must purchase rights, then rights can also be unaffordable. 
 Imagine that you are the king or queen of a wealthy nation with a population of 
one thousand people and a GDP of $100,000. You collect taxes at a flat rate of 10%, 
bringing your revenue to $10,000 a year. You decide that you would like to “purchase” a 
full set of rights for your citizens. You decide this set includes freedom of speech, the 
right to privacy, freedom of religion, the right to private property, and freedom of 
movement. After some analysis, you determine how much it will cost you to implement a 
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minimal version of each right Freedom of speech will require a court with judges to 
prosecute violations, which will cost $1000. The right to privacy will cost you the same 
plus the cost of an agency to determine regulations on what information your citizens 
should be able to protect, for a total of $1500. Next, you determine freedom of religion 
will need the same institutions and thus will cost the same, $1500. The right to private 
property will be more expensive, as it will require a police force. You determine 
protecting this right will cost $2500. Finally, freedom of movement will be the most 
expensive as you will need to create a system of roads, so this right will cost you $3000. 
In total, purchasing all of these legal rights for your citizens will run you $9500. Luckily, 
this is $500 less than your revenue for the year, so you will be able to purchase all of 
these rights, and have a surplus left over for whatever else your nation requires. 
 That is the easy example. Now, let us move to the harder example, and the one 
more relevant to this paper. You are still the king or queen of a nation with one thousand 
citizens, but now with a GDP of just $30,000. Your tax rate is still 10%, bringing your 
revenue to $3000 a year. You desire to purchase your citizens the same bundle of rights 
as the first example, and after some analysis, you determine that they will cost you 
exactly the same price to implement. Clearly, you do not have enough revenue to 
purchase all of the rights. 
 What options do you have left? You could just purchase freedom of movement or 
property rights, allowing your citizens to live without any protections for the other rights. 
You could also afford a bundle of two rights picked from freedom of speech, privacy 
rights, and freedom of religion. Either way, there is no feasible way for your citizens to 
have the entire bundle of rights. 
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 When we embrace the concept that all legal rights have budgetary costs, 
understanding why the poorest countries cannot create a top-ranked system of human 
rights is easy and intuitive. They cannot afford it. To compare the poorest countries to the 
wealthiest creates the trap of assuming that they face the same choices. This assumption 
is a mistake. When it comes to basic human rights, the wealthiest countries ask: how best 
do we protect these rights? The poorest must answer: which rights do we protect, and to 
what extent? 
 How might a developing nation choose among these rights? If all rights have 
equal moral value, we could pick between bundles by flipping a coin. This framework 
adds a new dimension to choices about protecting rights: monetary costs and benefits. 
 Before we fully apply this framework, let us first acknowledge another option—
purchasing cheaper, or discount, versions of rights. A discount right is simply the idea 
that something is better than nothing. For example, if the main expense for protecting 
freedom of movement is building a system of roads, is there another way to protect this 
right without this cost? What if, instead, a nation created a mediation system where you 
could bring complaints against those who prevent you from moving? Or, as is the case in 
certain rural areas of the United States, the state could mandate legal easements, which 
allow the public to cross private property to reach a destination. These systems would not 
protect freedom of movement like roads might, but they would provide protection where 
citizens otherwise would have none. This idea of purchasing discount versions of rights 
offers another element of rights. But it also creates new questions: at what point is a right 
so discounted that it becomes worthless? Are there certain rights that should never be 
bought at discount? The harsh reality is that nations living in extreme poverty face 
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decisions those with abundance may never consider. To make just choices when faced 
with such decisions, nations must use every tool at their disposal. In the next chapter, we 
will unpack these tools. 
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V. Economic Development as Means 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, we explored how extreme scarcity and limited protections 
of rights are intertwined problems for developing nations. Rights have monetary costs, 
and these costs present uniquely large obstacles for countries without wealth. For nations 
not in this category, there is literature available in ideal theory that provides guidance and 
on which rights are basic. For example, Rawls’ first principle of justice asserts a set of 
freedoms as a priority. However, these prescriptions do not provide guidance in the short-
term for nations that cannot afford to purchase this set of freedoms. 
 While the costs are the greatest barrier to entry for these nations, paradoxically, 
they are also the greatest source of guidance. If we accept that rights have both monetary 
costs and benefits, there is an entirely new dimension by which we can understand rights. 
This new dimension allows for two additional means of analysis. First, and most 
intuitive, it opens up the opportunity for discount opportunities. Second, monetary costs 
and benefits link rights to other rights. By abstracting conversations about a single right 
to a broader system, we can access a map that illuminates a path toward achieving a full 
set of robust rights. 
 As discussed in previous chapters, nations have more options at their disposal 
beyond either purchasing or not purchasing a right. They can also pursue a discounted 
version. Korina Hwang, a student as Claremont McKenna College, argued the merits of 
such a path in her senior thesis, “The Procedural Aspect of the Rule of Law: India as a 
Case Study for Distinguishing Concept from Conception.” Hwang focused on the Rule of 
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Law as a political ideal for both developing and developed countries.39 Hwang 
distinguishes between the procedural ends of Rule of Law, which require a legal system 
that—among other things—applies norms and directives effectively and consistently, and 
the conception of the Rule of Law, for example, the adversarial court system ingrained in 
Western thought.40 Due to cultural and capacity constraints stemming from economic 
limitations, India's adversarial system has proven ineffective and inconsistent at 
administering the nation’s laws.41 In contrast, mediation as an alternative to court 
litigation has produced more positive results.42 Here we find an example of a nation that, 
in light of its budgetary limitations, benefits from purchasing a “discount” version of a 
right, i.e., mediation over the adversarial system. 
 We can maintain that, given the resources, the adversarial court system might be 
more effective at furthering the moral ends of justice than a mediation system. Yet, 
because India cannot afford to implement such a system, attempting to do so actually 
undermines the initial ends of Rule of Law. Mediation accomplishes these ends more 
effectively while maximizing resources. Eventually, if India experiences enough 
economic growth, the nation’s citizens may benefit from a more robust and thorough set 
of rights under the adversarial system. But at the moment, Hwang’s research suggests 
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that the best use of resources is the less robust but more affordable “discount” version of 
Rule of Law, mediation. 
 Does this mean, given extreme scarcity, cheaper is always better? Not quite. 
Hwang’s example illustrates how we can use the monetary costs of rights to make 
prudent policy decisions. All rights have costs. But do rights also have monetary 
benefits? To understand how we can use monetary benefits as a tool, we must first 
recognize that rights are often connected. This is by no means novel. Amartya Sen, in 
Development as Freedom, uses this concept as a crucial component of his argument that 
development is “an integrated process of expansion of substantive freedoms that connect 
with one another.”43 Sen’s argument extends beyond that of rights, as discussed in this 
paper. Instead, Sen focuses on capabilities, as a “kind of freedom,” described informally 
as “the freedom to achieve various lifestyles.”44 To that end, Sen often speaks about legal 
rights as “determinants” of freedom, where his focus lies.45 While the two are not 
synonymous, they exist parallel enough that Sen’s work on the interrelatedness of 
freedom can serve as a springboard to understanding how rights interrelate. 
 To that end, Sen creates a distinction between how we might understand different 
aspects of human freedom. On the one hand, there is an “intrinsic importance of human 
freedom as the preeminent objective of development.”46 On the other, there is the 
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“instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of different kinds to promote human freedom.”47 
This idea is of particular relevance to this paper.  Sen provides the example of literacy. 
While many would argue that the freedom to read has intrinsic importance, Sen also 
highlights the instrumental value of literacy. Illiteracy provides a huge barrier to entry for 
economic activities, and thus inhibits economic growth. Furthermore, illiteracy acts as a 
barrier to political participation. In this way, literacy not only has intrinsic value but 
instrumental value from furthering economic and political freedoms.48 
 Certain rights, like freedoms, have instrumental value beyond their inherent value. 
To understand this phenomenon, let us focus on a specific case: property rights. In the 
realm of legal rights, we can understand property rights as institutionally protected by the 
government. As discussed at length, such protections are costly. First, legislators must 
make decisions about what constitutes ownership. Second, governments must pay for a 
system to adjudicate ownership disputes and violations. Moreover, they will have to pay 
for a police force to prevent violence, coercion, or burglary. Costs do not necessarily end 
there. For example, what if legislators decide they would like to protect property beyond 
that of material goods and include intellectual property. Then, they will need regulatory 
bodies to control how and when ideas are protected, such as the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office. 
Clearly, expanding property rights is a costly affair. Why would a developing 
nation dedicate so much of their limited resources to one place? In the spirit of Hwang, 
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perhaps we should seek to spend only a minimal amount on protections. But we are 
ignoring a crucial component of legal rights: monetary benefits. This is to ask: while we 
know that there are going to be costs associate with property rights, are there also 
economic benefits the nation will earn back? 
 As it turns out, the answer is yes. Orguzhan Dincer, a professor at Illinois State 
University, set out to quantify the economic benefits nations that invested in the 
protection of property rights received.49 Dincer gathered data from 1982–1997 on global 
economic development and property rights protections, using a rule of law index as a 
proxy.50 After adding a set of controls, Dincer modeled how saving rates devoted to 
physical or human capital varied based on the level of property rights protections.51 
Dincer found that “per Capita GDP in a country is positively related with the degree of 
property rights protection.”52 Furthermore, by sorting the countries into three 
categories—low, medium, and high degrees of property rights protection—Dincer 
managed to quantify the monetary return. The model suggests that for countries with a 
high degree of protection, a 10% increase in the saving rate devoted to physical capital 
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leads to an 11.1% increase in per capita GDP, whereas the same saving rate leads to a 
1.7% increase in per capita GDP in countries with a low degree of protection.53  
 Why is this 9.4 percentage point boost in GDP per capita so important? For one, it 
helps quantify the monetary benefit of these protections. Using a model such as Dincer’s, 
a developing nation could predict the return on their investment. But it actually does 
something even more groundbreaking. This model does not just measure monetary return 
on investments. It highlights a particular instrumental value of property rights. Why? As 
this paper has discussed at length, legal rights have costs—costs that restrict developing 
nations. An increase in GDP does not just mean a bigger economy or more wealth. 
Economic growth can also increase the potential of a developing nation to purchase 
additional legal rights. With the right decision-makers in power, a nation could invest that 
9.4 percentage point increase into building institutional protections for more rights. If we 
factor in the potential economic benefits of particular rights, our framework becomes 
more dynamic. Our choice is not: given X resources we can afford to purchase rights Y, 
Z, or A. Instead, it is a bit more complex. At this point, given X resources, we can afford 
to purchase rights Y, Z, or A. But, if we purchase Y now, it will spur economic growth to 
such an extent that in ten years, we can afford all three rights, whereas we can only afford 
one now. 
 As Sen writes extensively, there are many conceivable mechanisms by which 
some freedoms gain instrumental value. Through the framework developed in this paper, 
the potential of legal rights to spur economic development emerges as one such 
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mechanism. Legal rights can absorb the moral value of additional rights purchased by the 
economic gains it provides. Consequently, if a developing nation must choose between 
rights, the rights that “absorb” the value of others suddenly appear much more attractive. 
As discussed, rights may also gain instrumental value in other ways, such as limiting 
obstacles to our freedoms and capabilities. For example, perhaps protections for free 
speech does not produce the same level of economic growth as property rights, but free 
speech may reduce barriers to political participation and self-governance, and 
consequently empower citizens to protect other rights that they deem important. While 
this benefit may be harder to measure or quantify, that does not make this instrumental 
benefit any less valuable. 
 Economic growth as a mechanism is uniquely relevant for developing nations. For 
nations already living under conditions of moderate scarcity, there is less of a direct 
connection between increased economic growth and the acquiring of other legal rights. 
These nations might not currently protect rights, not due to reasons of budgetary 
limitations caused by GDP size, especially concerning the rights we consider basic. In 
contrast, the lack of rights protections experienced by developing nations is directly 
connected, and in part, caused by their small GDP.  
 In the previous chapter, we hinted at the limitations of economic growth as a 
mechanism for increasing right. Economic growth only enables the purchase of more 
rights; it does not mandate the purchase. Remember, back to the example of China. 
Despite the nation having the second-highest GDP in the world, it is only ranked 126 on 
the Human Freedom Index. Money is a necessary condition for the expansion of legal 
rights, but it is not sufficient. Economic growth expands rights when governments use 
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increased revenues to create institutions. This revenue only empowers governments to be 
able to purchase these protections. Without decision-makers with the proper incentives, 
this increased revenue could never be directed to expand rights. In fact, it could even be 
used to restrict them. Therefore, political freedoms that allow citizens to incentivize and 
check their governments might be considered preconditions for economic growth to fully 
realize its potential.  
 In the end, this framework offers a balance between two phenomena: 1) economic 
growth acting as a precondition for legal rights, and 2) certain legal rights acting as a 
precondition for manifesting the potential of economic growth. When it comes to 
developing nations, the order in which things are done matters. On the one hand, the 
issues raised in this paper present reasons for purchasing rights which spur economic 
growth first. Take our example of choosing between expanding protections for property 
rights and expanding protections of freedom of speech. If we only have enough revenue 
to expand protections for one of these rights, which should we choose? What if 
expanding freedom of speech will generate no additional economic growth, but 
expanding property rights will generate enough economic growth to expand protections 
for freedom of speech? If we expand property rights, in the long run, our end-state will 
enable the purchase of both rights. In contrast, if we purchase expansions for freedom of 
speech first, then our end-state will never allow for the purchase of both rights without 
outside events. But the keyword here is “enable.” Our second phenomenon suggests that 
without freedom of speech and other political freedoms, this economic growth might 
never be converted to any additional legal rights. 
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 The real-life decisions faced by developing nations are not quite as simple as 
binary choices presented in this paper’s thought experiments. Every nation will have its 
own obstacles, history, culture, and other facets that make its policy choices unique. 
Consequently, one struggles to imagine a universally applicable sequence of 
prioritization for legal rights. More likely, the road “out of the snowstorm” will look less 
like a straight line, and more like a winding road—expanding some of a right that 
promotes economic growth here and then expanding a political right that will ensure this 
growth is used best over there. This balancing act may not lead to quickest economic 
growth, but if there is any lesson from the Donner Party, shortcuts often carry great risk. 
 This is not an argument that developing nations should prioritize economic 
growth in the name of increasing legal rights. This is a push to weave the monetary costs 
and benefits of legal rights into the policy decision-making process. Rarely do 
conversations around rights forget their political components, yet they often forget their 
economic components. A cost-aware approach shines light on opportunities for saving, 
but monetary benefits of legal rights can provide opportunities for smart long-term policy 
decisions. In the end, economic development is a tool—and a powerful one—for 
understanding the potential of legal rights. Nevertheless, titular to this chapter, it is the 
means, not the end. 
 In practice, what does this distinction mean? Sen, in an article written in 1993, 
titled “Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism 
in Promoting Individual Freedoms,” argued against the assumption that economic 
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efficiency benefits of competitive markets would translate to freedoms. 54 While Sen 
conceded that the competitive market mechanism, absent certain externalities, does have 
the capability to promote the “autonomy and immunity from encroachment” aspects of 
freedom, issues of inequality also translate to the field of freedom, “and if anything tend 
to get magnified.”55 
 In this paper, Sen confronted perspectives that tout competitive markets as 
effective mechanisms in achieving economic development. Even if this were true, these 
arguments only advocate unrestrained competitive markets if economic development is 
the ultimate end. If economic development is only a means of achieving a more valued 
end—in Sen’s case, expanding capabilities—then the realm of what is justified in pursuit 
of economic development becomes considerably smaller.  
 This chapter references analysis quantifying the monetary benefits of property 
rights. Reasonably, the same methodology could be used on any legal right. For example, 
intuitively, freedom of movement does not only have intrinsic value, but an individual’s 
ability to interact unreservedly with their surroundings most likely has enormous 
economic implications. Unfortunately, the same level of research does not exist on other 
rights as has been conducted on property rights. If efforts in scholarship were made to 
quantify the economic implications of protecting other rights, developing nations would 
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have more resources at their disposal to maximize their budget while advancing legal 
rights. 
 Both of these cases in this chapter—Dincer’s research into property rights and 
Hwang’s exploration of India’s mediation system—illustrate how prioritizing certain 
legal rights might be approached under this paper’s framework. Historically, rights have 
often been shielded from their budgetary costs and benefits, as if such discussions might 
stain the purity of the moral concept. This resistance harms nations that are most 
vulnerable and would most benefit from the protection of legal rights. Countries with 
scarce resources do not have the privilege to ignore the real and unavoidable costs of 
protecting rights. However, they also could reap the benefits of fully informed decision-
making. Economic development, properly understood as a powerful tool to further the 
ends of legal rights, has the potential to ground policy choices within the reality of the 
obstacles facing struggling countries. This is why such discussions must feature the 
monetary costs and benefits of rights, not as an afterthought, but at their forefront.  
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VI. Economic Development as a Common Language 
 
 Conversations around rights often break down into two camps: those with beliefs 
adjacent to social liberalism and those with beliefs adjacent to libertarianism. Those in 
the first camp demand a relatively large bundle of political and economic rights and see 
government as a facilitator of public good. The second camp holds moral negative rights 
as a standard with the expectation that a limited government exists to protect those rights 
from infringement. Often, libertarians center their beliefs around protections for private 
property. In the world of moderate scarcity, disagreements about the role and extent of 
government can create an impenetrable divide on policy.  
My hope is that the framework offered in this paper may allow developing nations 
to avoid these divides, for two reasons. First, and not unique to this framework, the 
earliest stages of development seem to appeal to less disagreement in general. In 
conditions of moderate scarcity, disagreements often center around the ends of 
government. Social liberal theories lean towards ends of government such as expanding 
quality of life or—as Sen would argue—capabilities. In contrast, libertarians demand that 
the government protects citizens from infringements on their rights, and then, in a sense, 
get out of the way.  
In conditions of moderate scarcity, development has advanced enough that we 
seem to be surpassing the limits of government as libertarians would see it, yet still 
climbing to expand capabilities according to social liberals. For developing nations, their 
level of protection of rights is limited to such an extent by their resources. Both social 
liberals and libertarians tend to agree that such nations need an expanded government.  
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 The second reason, and more specific to this framework, is that, even though 
these camps disagree on the ends of government, both have reasons for supporting legal 
rights that spur economic growth. Social liberals, historically, are more resistant towards 
economic development taking the forefront of policy conversations, often leaning 
towards more egalitarian justifications. The framework presented in this paper is mostly 
aimed at such believers. The previous chapter argues the value of economic development 
as a mechanism for enabling the expansion of rights. Social liberals should favor rights 
that expand economic development for developing nations, not for economic 
development’s own sake, but for its ability to enable them to reach the egalitarian ends 
they seek. For example, they have reasons for protecting property rights before other 
rights, not because they see economic growth as a valued moral end, but because this 
economic growth will enable the government to purchase a larger, more robust system of 
protections for all citizens. 
 In contrast, Nozick-style libertarians’ belief system espouses the protection of 
property rights as of central importance. However, even if libertarians’ ideal end-state is a 
world with a limited government protecting negative rights, this framework gives them 
reasons to support policies in developing nations beyond those rights. Just as is the case 
for the social liberal, the protections libertarians hope to purchase will be costly (although 
not as costly). They will need a judiciary. Depending on how robust they wish their 
protections, they could require an expansive police force. As is the central argument of 
Holmes and Sunstein’s The Cost of Rights, these measures will require funding.  
 More importantly, libertarian claims to private property hinge upon the Lockean 
Proviso of leaving all individuals with “enough, and is good.” Many libertarians believe 
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that in conditions of moderate scarcity, this proviso is met. However, most would agree 
this proviso is not met in conditions of extreme scarcity. If libertarians wish for citizens 
to have claims to private property, they must first enact measures that further economic 
growth. To this end, libertarians have reasons to support a wide range of policies they 
might otherwise resist. In developing nations, a libertarian could conceivably support 
programs like mandatory vaccinations or intellectual property protections if they could be 
tied to economic growth. 
 By highlighting the value of the monetary costs and benefits of rights, this 
framework allows for more space for agreement on where developing nations should 
spend resources. Agreement, in the developing world, is arguably a more important asset 
than in the developed world. While the stagnation of government in countries like the 
United States due to polarization undoubtedly brings severe consequences, these 
consequences do not compare to those suffered in countries without self-sustaining 
institutions. 
This is not an argument that developing nations should subscribe to a tunnel 
vision approach centered upon economic growth. Nor is this even an argument that 
economic growth has more value than other justifications for purchasing certain legal 
rights. This is a reminder—a reminder of the importance of the economic realities. 
Countries in extreme scarcity do not have the luxury of considering costs as an 
afterthought. Attempting to apply an ideal theory of what set of rights should be protected 
for countries in moderate scarcity to developing nations is not only impractical but 
ignores the central question facing developing nations: what rights can we afford? 
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Without acknowledging that all legal rights have costs, it is impossible to have any 
conversations of worth for nations that cannot afford to ignore these costs. 
Furthermore, if one acknowledges costs, they should acknowledge that some 
rights also have monetary benefits. Without doing so, policymakers are vulnerable to 
making mistakes about the true impact of allocating resources towards specific 
protections. Whether connected through the mechanism of economic growth or another 
mechanism, rights can have instrumental value that is crucial for understanding how a 
developing nation can one day achieve a full bundle of rights. 
Finally, with these costs and benefits in mind, both sequencing and discounting 
become essential pillars of wise policymaking for countries in extreme scarcity. 
Sequencing, because the order in which resources are allocated to legal rights will impact 
the speed that the expansion of rights will become available. Discounting, because for 
countries without resources to spare, resources spent should be maximized. Furthermore, 
recognizing legal rights as subject to degrees of protection opens the door, justifying 
stripped-down legal rights that might otherwise be considered unacceptable in more 
developed nations. 
Somehow, along the way, conversations surrounding rights were siphoned into 
realms implicitly acknowledged as “non-economic areas.” But to discuss rights without 
economics is a privilege afforded to those not facing extreme economic pressure. For 
developing nations, there are no non-economic areas. To pretend otherwise is to not only 
counterproductively divert discussions, but to hold these nations to unjust and unfair 
standards. 
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